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Abstract—Public key infrastructures (PKIs) are one of the
main building blocks for securing communications over the
Internet. Currently, PKIs are under the control of centralized
authorities, which is problematic as evidenced by numerous
incidents where they have been compromised. The distributed,
fault tolerant log of transactions provided by blockchains and
more recently, smart contract platforms, constitutes a powerful
tool for the decentralization of PKIs. To verify the validity
of identity records, blockchain-based identity systems store on
chain either all identity records, or, a small (or even constant)
sized amount of data to verify identity records stored off chain.
However, as most of these systems have never been implemented,
there is little information regarding the practical implications of
each design’s tradeoffs.
In this work, we first implement and evaluate the only provably
secure, smart contract based PKI of [1] on top of Ethereum.
This construction incurs constant-sized storage at the expense of
computational complexity. To explore this tradeoff, we propose
and implement a second construction which, eliminates the need
for trusted setup, preserves the security properties of [1] and,
as illustrated through our evaluation, is the only version with
constant-sized state that can be deployed on the live chain of
Ethereum. Furthermore, we compare these two systems with
the simple approach of most prior works, e.g., the Ethereum
Name Service, where all identity records are stored on the smart
contract’s state, to illustrate several shortcomings of Ethereum
and its cost model. We propose several modifications for fine
tuning the model, which would be useful to be considered for
any smart contract platform like Ethereum so that it reaches its
full potential to support arbitrary distributed applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contrary to its original, clean design principles, the Internet
today is not completely decentralized. For example, Domain
Name System (DNS) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) ser-
vices, provide the most critical building blocks for facilitating
and securing communications over the Internet. These systems
manage mappings between identity names and values (i.e., an
IP address for DNS, or a public-key for PKIs). Unfortunately,
these critical systems are under the control of centralized,
remote parties that must be trusted to function correctly. This is
problematic as evidenced by the numerous incidents in, e.g.,
centralized PKIs, where certification authorities (CAs) have
been compromised (e.g., [2], [3], [4]).
Since the advent of Bitcoin, blockchains show promise
for building systems that are completely distributed with
no trusted parties. Blockchains solve the well studied prob-
lem of distributed consensus ([5]) in an open networking
environment. They provide a distributed, fault-tolerant, au-
ditable, append-only ledger of transactions. As a result of
this potential, there have been calls from the community
to “re-decentralize” the Internet by leveraging blockchain
technologies to build critical naming and PKI services and,
thus, eliminate the Internet’s reliance on centralized entities
(e.g., [6], [7]).
Notable examples of blockchain-based identity management
systems are Namecoin ([7]) and Emercoin ([8]). These systems
employ the blockchain to store, verify and query for records
pertaining to identities. However, this approach is inefficient
for several reasons. First, it forces clients to download and
maintain an entire copy of the blockchain to verify records.
Second, computation and storage requirements scale linearly
with the number of registered records. Third, it limits the
system’s applicability by excluding important, storage-limited
devices, e.g., smartphones. Finally, it bloats the blockchain,
increasing the size of the state that miners have to maintain,
which may not align well with incentives of new miners that
wish to sync and contribute to the blockchain’s security.
To deal with these inefficiencies, researchers have recently
proposed systems based on next-generation blockchains, i.e.,
smart contract platforms ([9], [1]). These systems decouple
storage of identity records from their verification. Storage
of identity records is handled by a separate, authenticated
(but potentially unreliable) storage network which allows for
a more compact retrieval of the full history of operations,
compared to downloading and validating the entire blockchain.
To verify the validity of identity records, they maintain on
the smart contract’s state cryptographic accumulators, which
are space-efficient data structures that allow for verifiable
membership and non membership queries.
Until now, these smart contract based identity management
systems have not been implemented and, thus, there is little
practical experience to guide developers and to inform design
tradeoffs of future systems. In this paper, we examine the
practical issues in building smart contract based PKI systems.
We describe our experience of implementing on Ethereum the
recently proposed, state-of-the-art, smart contract based PKI
of Patsonakis et al. [1]. We choose this system because it is the
only PKI with a security model and proof that it provides the
claimed service while, at the same time, consuming constant-
sized state, as opposed to prior blockchain-based PKIs. The
system’s main building block is a public state, additive,
universal accumulator based on the strong-RSA assumption.
This accumulator favors storage overhead at the expense of
computational overhead necessary to achieve constant-sized
state and proofs. To explore the storage versus computational
cost tradeoff, we propose a second smart contract based PKI
built on top of the Hash tree-based, universal accumulator
of [10]. Unlike the RSA-based accumulator, the Hash tree-
based accumulator does not require a trusted setup and, thus,
leads to a truly decentralized system while, at the same time,
preserves the same security model and properties of the RSA-
based approach. We also compare both of these systems
with the simple approach of most prior schemes, e.g., the
Ethereum Name Service ([11]), where all identity records are
stored on the smart contract’s state and we illustrate several
shortcomings of Ethereum and its cost model.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
First, we evaluate experimentally all three smart contract
based PKI schemes and illustrate the monetary costs of their
operations, as well as those of their building blocks. Our
results illustrate that the Hash tree-based construction is the
only smart contract based PKI with constant-sized state that
can be deployed on Ethereum’s live chain, thus, providing
the first viable and provably secure, on-blockchain authenti-
cation mechanism. Second, we present several shortcomings
of Ethereum’s current cost model and the ways in which:
i) it affects each version of the PKI system, ii) it impedes
the establishment of a standard library of smart contracts,
iii) it incentivizes smart contract developers to adopt several
malpractices and, iv) it prices on-blockchain storage of data.
Third, we propose several modifications to Ethereum’s cost
model, which are minor and fair, to address the aforementioned
issues and others. Finally, we identify several problem areas
we encountered while developing on top of Ethereum and
make concrete proposals for improving the platform with
the aim of increasing both developer productivity and smart
contract reliability. We argue that these improvements are
sensible for any smart contract platform that wishes to support
user developed distributed applications.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a large number of prior works on PKIs, in general.
Due to lack of space, we review related work specifically on
decentralized, blockchain and smart contract based PKIs.
Several works propose systems that employ the blockchain
to store, query and verify the validity of each (identity,public-
key) pair, or, some representation (e.g., hash) of it ([7], [8],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]). Blockstack ([6]) allows the
development of arbitrary state machines via its virtualchains,
i.e., it is a smart contract platform. Blockstack’s BNS is a
virtualchain (smart contract) that implements a distributed
DNS. BNS stores the hashes of DNS zone files ([17]) on Atlas,
Blockstack’s distributed peer network. BNS clients verify the
validity of each zone file hash stored in Atlas by searching
the blockchain for a BNS transaction that contains this hash.
Thus, BNS incurs the same inefficiencies of Namecoin and
Emercoin, which we discussed in the Introduction. In contrast,
our Hash tree-based PKI follows a different design princi-
ple that stores on the smart contract’s state a constant and
verifiable representation of all (identity,public-key) pairs by
employing cryptographic accumulators. Clients of our PKI
can verify the validity of records pertaining to identities via
these accumulators and by interacting with a (potentially
unreliable) storage network. Thus, in our PKI, there is no need
to linearly search the blockchain. In addition, our design can be
implemented on top of any system that allows the development
of smart contracts. Thus, our Hash tree-based PKI can be even
implemented on top of Blockstack. Nonetheless, we chose
to implement our construction on top of Ethereum because
it has a more rich and diverse ecosystem of applications.
Multisignature wallets (e.g., [18]) and various (non) fungible
tokens (e.g., [19]) are just a couple example applications that
can benefit from the standard, on-blockchain authentication
mechanism that our construction provides.
Melara et al. [20] introduce CONIKS, a privacy-preserving
decentralized PKI where users can monitor the consistency
of their own (identity,public-key) pairs. While privacy is an
important property, e.g., for chat applications, it is not a
requirement for traditional PKIs. For instance, in the web-PKI
paradigm, the (identity,public-key) pairs of participants are
public. CONIKS’s operation is based on “identity providers”,
i.e., centralized entities that sign authenticated bindings and
appropriately transform identity names for privacy purposes.
CONIKS assumes the existence of a separate PKI to distribute
the public keys of identity providers. Thus, it does not con-
stitute a standalone PKI service, whilst our Hash tree-based
PKI does. More importantly, CONIKS, lacks a formal proof of
its security and privacy guarantees. This is also the case for
systems derived from CONIKS, i.e., EthIKS ([21]), Catena
([22]) and Conifer ([23]), which implement CONIKS on top
of Ethereum and Bitcoin. Certcoin ([9]) is a blockchain-based
PKI proposal that employs cryptographic accumulators but has
a number of inefficiencies, e.g., it recomputes, from scratch,
accumulator values during each revocation. Furthermore, Cert-
coin has no security model for the PKI it implements nor a
proof that it provides the claimed service ([1]).
Formal proofs of security are essential for critical security
infrastructures. The Hash tree-based PKI we present here
is built on top of the hash tree, universal accumulator of
Camacho et al. [10], which is a public-state, additive, universal
accumulator. Thus, it conforms to the design of the smart
contract based PKI of Patsonakis et al. [1], which proposes the
use of public-state additive, universal accumulators to realize a
PKI and is the only PKI system with a formal proof of security.
Furthermore, our construction advances the state-of-the-art
system of Patsonakis et al. [1] by eliminating the need for
a trusted setup phase and, thus, leads to a truly decentralized
PKI service. Lastly, the state consumed by our construction is
of constant size, contrary to systems such as EthIKS, whose
state grows linearly with the number of identities registered
in the system. We discuss the problems that arise from linear
state (PKI) constructions on public smart contract platforms
more thoroughly in Section VI-C.
III. ETHEREUM
Ethereum is a blockchain-based platform for the devel-
opment of smart contracts, i.e., stateful agents that “live”
in the blockchain and can execute arbitrary state transition
functions. Developing a smart contract involves writing its
code in a high-level, Turing-complete programming language
(e.g., Solidity [24]), which is then compiled-down to Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM) initialization code. Contracts become
part of Ethereum’s global state (deployment) by wrapping their
initialization code in a transaction, signing it and broadcasting
it to the network. The state and the code of smart contracts are
publicly accessible, thus, they can be trusted for correctness,
provided their code was properly audited and the blockchain
is secure, but not for privacy. Accessing the state of smart
contracts can be performed efficiently via Ethereum’s light
client protocol ([25]). Users can interact with contracts by
issuing transactions that specify the code to be executed and
its input arguments. In addition, contracts can call functions of
other contracts, which is known as a message call, as a result
of a user’s transaction. Ethereum’s cryptocurrency is called
ether and serves as a means to incentivize participants (miners)
to engage in the protocol. Transactions fees, which compensate
miners for their work, are expressed in a unit called gas and
are a function of their byte size and the complexity of the
code they invoke (if any). Ethereum employs a flat cost model,
i.e., each transaction byte and EVM operation costs some
predefined amount of gas ([26]). Transactions specify a gas
price, which converts ether to gas and influences the incentive
of miners to include it in their next block. The higher the gas
price, the higher its real monetary cost and priority to be mined
([27]). A transaction that consumes gcost gas and specifies a
gas price of gprice will cost E = gcost× gprice units of ether.
Lastly, transactions and message calls, specify an upper bound
on the amount of gas that they can consume. This protects
miners from, e.g., getting stuck in an infinite loop, an issue
that stems from Ethereum’s Turing-completeness.
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCUMULATORS
Cryptographic accumulators (first introduced in [28]) pro-
vide a constant-sized representation of a set of elements
and allow for verifiable membership and, in some cases,
non membership queries. In the design of [1], the smart
contract acts as the accumulator manager and employs two
instances of a public-state, additive, universal accumulator
with domain {0, 1}∗. First, as the smart contract’s state and
code are publicly accesible, the accumulator’s operations have
to be performed by exclusively relying on public information
(public-state). Second, the accumulator’s construction must, at
least, support addition of elements (additive), to allow clients
to register their (identity,public-key) pairs. Third, universal
accumulators allow for bothmembership and non-membership
verifications. Non membership verifications are essential since
clients interested in registering to the PKI have to prove that
their identity is not taken. In accumulators, proofs of, e.g.,
(non) membership, are referred to as witnesses.
The relevant syntax of the public-state, additive, universal
accumulator of [1] to the constructions implemented in this
work is:
• KeyGen(1λ): Generates a key pair (pk, sk) and outputs
pk.
• InitAcc(pk): Outputs an accumulator value c0, referring
to the empty accumulated set X ← ∅.
• Add(pk, x, c): Computes and outputs a new accumulator
value c′ and W , a membership witness for x ∈ X .
• MemWitGen(pk,X, c): If x ∈ X , it outputs a member-
ship witness W for x.
• NonMemWitGen(pk,X, c, x): If x /∈ X , it outputs a non
membership witness W for x.
• VerifyMem(pk, x,W, c) : If W is an honestly produced
membership witness for x ∈ X , it outputs 1, otherwise,
0.
• VerifyNonMem(pk, x,W, c): If W is an honestly pro-
duced non membership witness for x /∈ X , it outputs
1, otherwise, 0.
Below, we provide information on the specific accumulator
constructions that we employ in our two implementations.
RSA-based Universal Accumulator: The construction of
the smart contract based PKI of Patsonakis et al. [1] is built on
top of the RSA-based universal accumulator of Li et al. [29].
This accumulator requires a trusted party to run the KeyGen
algorithm since, knowledge of the accumulator’s secret key sk
can be used to break its security. To deal with the issue that
the accumulator’s input domain is restricted to prime numbers,
the authors of [1] incorporate a deterministic procedure Map
that, on input an arbitrary string, outputs a prime number.
This procedure is based on a function f , which is chosen
uniformly at random from a universal hash function family
U : {0, 1}3k → {0, 1}k ([30]). An arbitrary string s is mapped
to a prime number by, first, computing the hash of the string,
i.e., h(s) ∈ {0, 1}k, and by repeatedly sampling from the set
{x ∈ {0, 1}3k : f(x) = h(s)} until a prime is found. The
sampling is performed by fixing the randomness to depend
on the input string. After sampling O(k2) times, Map will
output a prime number, except with negligible probability. To
circumvent the fact that deletions in RSA accumulators require
access to the accumulator’s secret key, the authors employ a
trick that is presented in [31]. Essentially, the i-th time an
input string s is added or deleted, an element x = (s, i, a) or
x = (s, i, d) is accumulated, respectively. Lastly, in the RSA
accumulator, both the accumulator’s value and its witnesses
have constant bit size.
Hash tree-based Universal Accumulator: The accumula-
tor of Camacho et al. [10], which our construction employs,
is a public-state, additive, universal accumulator with the fol-
lowing differences and additional features. First and foremost,
the accumulator is strong, i.e., the accumulator manager is not
required to be trusted. Informally, a strong accumulator does
not require a trusted setup (there is no KeyGen algorithm).
Second, it supports the deletion of elements without relying
on secret information. Third, it allows for additions/deletions
which are publicly verifiable. The latter is accomplished by an
algorithm CheckUpdate, which, on input a witness returned
by either Add or Delete and the accumulator’s values before
and after the update, it outputs 1, if the update was performed
honestly and 0, otherwise. The accumulator of [10] is based
on collision-resistant hash functions and its underlying data
structure is a balanced, binary, hash tree. In a few words, the
accumulator’s value is the hash of the root node and witnesses
are hash path(s) starting from some node(s) (not necessarily
leaf node(s)) that lead all the way up to the root node. Note
that the accumulator’s value is of constant size, however, (non)
membership and update witnesses have O(λ log(n)) bit size,
where n is the number of accumulated elements and λ is the
security parameter.
V. CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we illustrate how we employ the constructs
of Sections III and IV to realize two versions of the smart con-
tract based PKI of [1]. The first is the construction provided in
[1] and is based on the RSA accumulator that was highlighted
in Section IV. The second, which we present in this work, is
based on the Hash-tree accumulator of [10]. The core idea of
both schemes is decoupling the storage of (identity,public-key)
pairs from the verification of their validity.
The storage of information relevant to the protocol, e.g.,
(identity,public-keys) pairs, is offloaded to an external database
component. In [1], this component is modeled as an unreliable
database functionality FUDB (referred to as UDB from now
on), since the adversary is allowed to arbitrarily modify its
state. As proven in [1], the scheme’s security is not affected
by such adversarial behaviour. The involvement of UDB in
the protocol is twofold. First, clients query UDB to obtain
information that will allow them to, subsequently, interact
with the smart contract. Second, following an interaction with
the smart contract, the clients post to UDB information that
reflect the system’s updated state.
The smart contract maintains two cryptographic accumu-
lators to facilitate the verification of the validity of iden-
tities, or, (identity,public-key) pairs. The first accumulator,
c1, accumulates (identity,public-key) pairs, allowing clients
to infer if a pair is currently registered or not. The second
accumulator, c2, accumulates identities, allowing clients to
infer if an identity is registered or not. As shown in [1],
one accumulator would suffice, however, at the expense of
complicating the protocol’s presentation and increasing its
computational complexity, issues we also want to avoid here.
In both schemes, the smart contract is the most essential
and expensive component to interact with in the system. Since
its active involvement is required only during registration and
revocation of (identity,public-key) pairs and due to lack of
space, in this work, we only explain how these two operations
are performed. To register her pair, a client queries the UDB
to obtain the history of operations, which will allow her to
compute a proof that her identity is not accumulated in c2.
To revoke her pair, the client, instead, computes a proof that
her pair is accumulated in c1 and proves possession of the
corresponding secret key. The latter is implemented via a
digital signature on the public key.
A. RSA-based PKI
This construction is based on the RSA accumulator, which
we highlighted in Section IV. Figure 3 of Appendix A illus-
trates the smart contract’s pseudocode for this implementation.
Here, c1 accumulates (id, pk, i, op) tuples and c2 accumulates
(id, i, op) tuples, where op = a or op = d.
A client that wishes to register her (identity,public-key) pair
produces, at most, two witnesses. First, a non membership
witness W1 for the tuple (id, i, a) in c2. Second, and only
if her identity has been registered at least once in the past
(i ≥ 2), a membership witness W2 for the tuple (id, i− 1, d)
in c2. Assuming both conditions hold, she will be able to
convince the smart contract that her identity is available. To
construct these witnesses, the client queries UDB for the
history of operations and locates records (if any) pertaining
to her identity to find the proper value for index i. Then, she
invokes the Register function of the smart contract and, as a
result, will receive the updated values of the accumulators and
two new witness values, W1 and W2. These are membership
witnesses for the tuples (id, pk, i, a) in c1 and (id, i, a) in
c2, respectively. Next, the client computes a non membership
witness W3 for the tuple (id, i, d) in c2. Lastly, she posts a
(Register, id, pk, i,W1,W2,W3) record to the UDB which,
among others, facilitates queries from other clients for the
validity of her mapping.
To revoke her (identity,public-key) pair, a client generates
the following proofs. First, a signature of her public-key
(σsk(pk)). Second, a membership witness W1 for the tuple
(id, pk, i, a) in c1. Third, a non membership witness W2 for
the tuple (id, pk, i, d) in c1. The witnesses are constructed
similarly to the case of registration, i.e., by querying UDB.
Following a successful revocation of her mapping, the client
posts a (Revoke, id, pk, i) record to UDB.
B. Hash tree-based PKI
In this section, we propose an alternative construction,
which is based on the Hash-tree accumulator of [10]. This
accumulator supports additions and deletions which are pub-
licly verifiable. Thus, clients can perform, locally, additions
and deletions of elements and supply the smart contract
with appropriate witnesses which prove that the operations
were performed honestly. To generate all involved witnesses,
clients query UDB for the history of operations. Figure 4 of
Appendix A illustrates the smart contract’s pseudocode for this
implementation.
To register an (identity,public-key) pair, the client gen-
erates a non membership witness W2 for her identity in
c2. She then performs, locally, the following updates. First,
she accumulates the tuple (id, pk) in c1, which produces
an addition update witness Wadd1 and the updated value of
the accumulator cadd1 . Second, she accumulates her identity
in c2, which produces an addition update witness Wadd2
and the accumulator’s updated value cadd2 . Assuming all
values were computed honestly, the contract will validate
the proofs by invoking CheckUpdate(c2, cadd2,Wadd2 , id),
CheckUpdate(c1, cadd1,Wadd1 , (id, pk)) and VerifyNonMem
(c2,W2, id), and update its accumulator values. Lastly, the
client posts a (Register, id, pk) to the UDB.
To revoke an (identity,public-key) pair, the client first signs
her public-key (σsk(pk)). Second, she generates a membership
witness W1 for the tuple (id, pk) in c1. She then performs,
locally, two updates. First, she deletes her identity from c2,
which produces a deletion update witness Wdel2 and the ac-
cumulator’s updated value cdel2 . Second, she deletes the tuple
(id, pk) from c1, which produces a deletion update witness
Wdel1 and the accumulator’s updated value cdel1 . Assuming all
values were computed honestly, the contract will validate the
proofs by invoking CheckUpdate(c1, cdel1 ,Wdel1 , (id, pk)),
CheckUpdate(c2, cdel2 ,Wdel2 , id) and VerifyMem(c1,W1, (id
, pk)), and update its accumulator values. Lastly, the client
posts a (Revoke, id, pk) record to the UDB, which is not
stored, but simply leads to the deletion of her registration
record.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we present experiments that measure the
cost of running on Ethereum the constructions of Section V,
as well as their building blocks. Throughout this section,
we intersperse our results with recommendations for modi-
fications and/or improvements to Ethereum that, we believe,
are vital if Ethereum (or any smart contract platform) is to
reach its maximum potential of supporting arbitrary distributed
applications (especially in the large scale [32]). We create
a private blockchain that is maintained by a single mining
node. This eliminates the waiting time that transactions would
have in either the live or the test chain to be mined into a
block. Thus, we are able to measure accurately transaction
gas costs and perform experiments on a larger scale. We
run our experiments on a CentOS 7 server that is equipped
with an 8-core, 64-bit, Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @
2.10GHz (with hyperthreading) and 32 GB of RAM. We use
the latest, stable release of geth (v.1.8.17, [33]), the official
Ethereum client. We conduct our experiments via the truffle
suite (v.4.1.13, [34]), a testing framework that automatically
handles compilation and deployment of contracts and provides
easy-to-use, JavaScript-based means of interacting with them.
Finally, we use randomly generated 32-byte identities.
Our implementations employ a variety of primitives, e.g.,
signatures and accumulators. One option would be to deploy
each primitive as a separate library and have the front-end
PKI contract issue appropriate message calls. Unfortunately,
this option is the most expensive in terms of gas due to the
extra cost of message calls (700 gas) and the increased cost of
reading the deployment address(es) of the library contract(s)
from storage. The more efficient option is to pack all back-
end logic into a single library and link it with the front-end
PKI contract. This eliminates the aformentioned costs. Thus,
Ethereum imposes the following tradeoff. On the one hand,
developers will tend to pick the second option, as one of their
main incentives is to minimize gas cost. On the other hand,
the first option: 1) promotes modular programming, 2) leads
to the construction of an on-blockchain “standard library”,
similar to what common programming languages have and
most importantly, 3) mitigates duplicate logic, i.e., excess,
duplicate state and code in the blockchain. Thus, reducing the
costs of the first option will aid in the development of future
applications and incentivize developers to adopt more modular
programming approaches.
Recommendation #1: Significantly reduce the cost of
issuing message calls to libraries.
Our first experiment provides insight regarding the over-
head of a library implementation, compared to a precompiled
contract. Precompiled contracts reside on well-known, static
addresses and require less gas because their code does not run
in EVM assembly, but in machine language of the physical
node hosting the miner. We evaluate the cost of verifying
1,000 Secp256k1 elliptic curve signatures, based on the library
contract of [35]. We measure a mean cost of 827,765.53
gas, with a standard deviation of 6,021.64 gas. At the time
of this writing, the average gas limit of blocks is about 8
million gas ([36]). Thus, signature verification on the library
contract consumes 10.3% of the current block gas limit, which
is substantial. In contrast, Ethereum’s ecrecover precompiled
contract, which operates on the same curve, costs only 3,000
gas. Thus, the cost of the library implementation is two orders
of magnitude higher, which illustrates the benefits and impor-
tance of having built-in support for a variety of cryptographic
operations. In the evaluation of all the constructions that
follow, we have modified the library contract of [35] to operate
on the Secp256r1 curve. We repeat the same experiment
and measure the mean cost of signature verification to be
1,257,103.26 gas, with a standard deviation of 9,178.44 gas.
A. RSA-based PKI Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the RSA-based PKI of Sec-
tion V-A, which employs the following constructs. First,
signature verification via the Secp256r1 library contract. Sec-
ond, arbitrary precision integer arithmetic, based on the Big
Number library developed by the Zerocoin team ([37]). This
library supports operations which are relevant to this con-
struction, such as modulo exponentiation and the Miller-Rabin
probabilistic primality test. We modify the implementation
of the primality test because: 1) the original supports only
a range of integers, whilst, our implementation supports all
integers, 2) the original algorithm is seeded by externally
provided randomness, which we modify to be based on the
hash of the last block, thus, limiting the adversary’s knowledge
and influence on its output and, 3) the original does not
perform sufficient iterations, which we modify to comply
to the NIST standard ([38]), i.e., 64 witness loop iterations,
thus, the probability a composite number will be declared as
prime is 2−128. The third employed construct is the RSA
accumulator, which encompasses the Map procedure. The
RSA moduli of the accumulators are 3072 bits long, thus, they
provide 128-bit security ([39]). Recall thatMap uses a function
f : {0, 1}3k → {0, 1}k chosen uniformly at random from a
universal hash function family U . We set Map’s parameter to
k = 65, i.e., Map outputs 3k = 195 bit primes. Thus, except
for 1/265 fraction of functions f ∈ U , a string will be mapped
to a prime number, except with negligible probability ([40]),
which we deem reasonable.
Operation
Gas Cost
Min Max Mean Std
Mod. Mul. 179,556 182,900 181,470.76 639.16
Mod. Exp. 678,074 745,517 741,846.48 5,001.49
Primality Test 1,481,160 1,502,502 1,490,219.13 5,480.23
Add 810,030 810,158 810,153.32 17.61
VerifyMem 755,130 755,796 755,537.23 126.63
VerifyNonMem 1,473,345 1,525,685 1,519,279.96 5,386.87
Map 1,733,124,331 2,550,435,741 2,141,780,036 577,926,440.35
Register (i = 1) 89,801,425 8,620,016,945 1,681,994,990 1,313,539,096.67
Register (i ≥ 2) 89,160,026 10,676,126,282 2,575,538,734.5 1,715,254,997.91
Revoke 440,467,878 13,805,874,517 3,598,585,618 1,910,918,965.1
TABLE I: Min, max, mean and standard deviation (columns 2-5) of the gas cost of: 1) 10,000 modulo multiplications,
exponentiations and primality tests in the Big Number library, 2) 10,000 accumulations of primes (Add) and (non) membership
witness verifications (VerifyMem,VerifyNonMem) 3) 1,000 mappings (Map) of strings to primes and, 4) registrations (Register,
for (i = 1) and (i ≥ 2)) and revocations (Revoke) of 1,000 (identity,public-key) pairs in the RSA-based PKI.
We conduct four sets of experiments where the bit lengths
of the exponents, moduli and exponentiation bases are 195,
3072 and 3072 bits long, respectively. First, we evaluate the
operations of the Big Number library that are relevant to
this construction by running 10,000 primality tests, modulo
multiplications and exponentiations, respectively. Second, we
evaluate the RSA accumulator by running 10,000 iterations
of each of the following operations: 1) accumulations (Add)
of 195-bit prime numbers, and 2) (non) membership witness
verifications (VerifyMem,VerifyNonMem). Third, we measure
the cost of 1,000 mappings (Map) of strings to 195-bit prime
numbers. Fourth, we measure the cost of registering (Register)
and revoking (Revoke) 1,000 (identity,public-key) pairs in the
RSA-based PKI. Recall that registration differentiates between
two cases, i.e., whether an identity is registered for the first
time (i = 1), or not (i ≥ 2). Table I illustrates the results.
Regarding the Big Number library experiments, Table I
shows that modulo exponentiation and primality testing are
the more expensive operations. The former is based on one
of Ethereum’s precompiled contracts ([41]) and its cost is
dominated by the exponent’s length, especially in cases where
it is larger than 32 bytes. In addition, this operation is invoked
in the (main) witness loop of the Miller-Rabin test, thus, the
data suggest that, on average, the primality test performs two
loop iterations. To compute the cost of the RSA accumulator’s
operations, we have to factor in the cost of reading from
storage the accumulator’s value, its exponentiation base and
its modulus (a total of 36 EVM words). The cost of reading
an EVM word (32 bytes) from storage is 200 gas, thus,
36×200 = 7, 200 extra gas. The VerifyMem operation involves
one modulo exponentiation. The VerifyNonMem operation
involves two modulo exponentiations and one modulo multi-
plication. Thus, as the data suggest, the gas cost of these two
operations follows directly from that of reading the appropriate
values from the contract’s storage and the invoked operations
of the Big Number library. The Add operation involves one
modulo exponentiation and modifies the accumulator’s value.
Thus, in addition to the aforementioned cost of reading from
the contract’s storage, there is also the cost of storing the
accumulator’s updated value to the contract’s state. Updating
an EVM word on storage costs 5,000 gas. The accumulator is
12 EVM words long, thus, 12 × 5, 000 = 60, 000 extra gas,
or, a total of 60, 000 + 7, 200 = 67, 200 gas.
The key result of this section is our demonstration of the
practical implications of the RSA-based PKI’s design. Recall
that in this construction, the smart contract’s state and (non)
membership witnesses have constant size at the expense of
computational overhead. This tradeoff is embodied by the
O(k2) complexity of the Map procedure, which is involved
in both the Register and Revoke operations of the RSA-
based PKI, to map the contract’s inputs to prime numbers.
These prime numbers are then input to the appropriate witness
verification algorithms of the RSA accumulator. For instance,
the Revoke operation involves one signature verification, one
invocation of VerifyNonMem and VerifyMem each and three
invocations ofMap. We have already illustrated that the cost of
signature verification and of the RSA accumulator’s operations
is deterministic, however, the same cannot be said about Map.
While Map is deterministic in terms of its output, the number
of iterations it performs to produce its output is not. Thus,
we can have cases where one invocation of Map costs more
than a Register or Revoke operation of the RSA-based PKI, as
illustrated by the heavily skewed data of Table I. Consequently,
Map dominates the cost of the RSA-based PKI’s operations.
We perform an additional experiment where we measure the
cost of running one iteration of Map on input of 100,000
strings. We measure the average gas cost to be 9,488,542.32
gas, with a standard deviation of 17,794.86 gas. Consequently,
even one iteration of Map exceeds Ethereum’s block gas limit.
Result #1: The provably secure, RSA-based smart con-
tract PKI is not viable in Ethereum.
Discussion: There are two reasons why Map’s gas cost is
so high. First, in Ethereum, it is cheaper to access one EVM
word (32 bytes) than one byte. This “was chosen to facilitate
the Keccak256 hash scheme and elliptic-curve computations”,
as stated in Ethereum’s yellow paper ([26]). It has nothing to
do with efficiency as no real-world physical machine, on top of
which the EVM runs, supports 32 byte words. Therefore, one
potential improvement would be to modify Ethereum’s cost
model to account for this contradiction. For instance, accessing
a single byte could be simply tuned to 1
32
of the cost of loading
an EVM word. This change, apart from being more fair, allows
for more packed data encodings which can reduce the size of
transactions and, as a result, the size of the blockchain. Second,
Map’s computation revolves around bit operations, which are,
currently, very expensive in Ethereum as they have to be
performed via the EVM’s integer exponentiation function. For
instance, setting one bit of a memory byte array costs 586 gas.
However, in the near future, the EVM will support bitwise
shifting ([42]), which will only cost 3 gas and, thus, will
provide substantial improvements for Map.
Recommendation #2: Ethereum’s cost model should be
modified to account for the granularity of the data that
are accessed.
Nevertheless, for the RSA-based PKI, there are other alter-
natives that we can explore, which we leave as future work,
that will also benefit from all the aforementioned propositions,
such as verifiable computation ([43]). In this setting, the
smart contract will need only to verify proofs that the client
computed Map correctly, instead of invoking Map itself.
B. Hash tree-based PKI Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the Hash-based PKI, which
we proposed in Section V-B. This construction employs the
following primitives: 1) the Secp256r1 library contract for
signature verification and, 2) the Hash tree accumulator of
Section IV. We employ the SHA-256 hash function, which is
exposed as a precompiled contract in Ethereum. Recall that
in the Hash-based PKI, all involved proofs are a logarithmic
function of the number of accumulated elements, in contrast
to the RSA-based construction, where they are constant-sized.
In our first experiment, we accumulate a total of 100,000
elements and measure the cost of the Hash tree accumulator’s
operations. In Figures 1a and 1b, we plot the gas cost ver-
sus the number of accumulated elements of verifying (non)
membership witnesses (VerifyMem,VerifyNonMem) and ac-
cumulator updates (CheckUpdate), respectively. The general
trend resembles, as expected, that of a logarithmic function.
However, the curves have a large number of dips. This is
because in this scheme, proofs are paths of the accumulator’s
hash tree. The size of each proof depends on the position of
the starting node(s) in the hash tree and, thus, its verification
cost varies. As illustrated in the graphs, verifying accumulator
updates is more expensive than that of (non) membership
witnesses. Indeed, the size of the former proofs tends to be
two, or even, three times the size of the latter, which is
reflected in their respective verification costs.
In our second experiment, we evaluate our Hash-based PKI
construction. In Figure 2, we plot the gas cost versus the
number of registered pairs of registering and revoking 100,000
(identity,public-key) pairs. The results show that revocation is
the more costly procedure as it involves the added cost of
verifying signatures. The cost of the most expensive revocation
that we measured was 2,999,214 gas, i.e., 37.4% of the current
block gas limit. Thus, in terms of gas cost, this construction
can be deployed on the main chain of Ethereum.
Result #2: Our Hash-based PKI construction is viable
for deployment on the main chain of Ethereum.
Discussion: The Hash-based PKI is best suited for small,
to moderately sized PKIs, since the involved proofs are not
of constant size. Assuming that the number of registered
pairs monotonically increases, there will come a point where
verifying proofs will exceed the block’s gas limit. Recall that
the cost of a transaction is a function of its computational
complexity and its byte size. One might argue that this
issue can be balanced out by an increase in the block’s gas
limit, which is certainly the observed trend up to the time
of this writing ([36]). However, a miner’s main incentive is
to produce (hash) blocks as fast and with as low operational
costs as possible. Thus, it can be expected that the increase
in the block’s gas limit will, eventually, plateau. This line of
reasoning assumes that the blockchain’s consensus mechanism
revolves around Proof-of-Work (PoW), as is currently the
case. However, Ethereum is planning to replace PoW with
Proof-of-Stake (PoS), a consensus protocol that requires a
small amount of computation. Discussing PoS is out of the
scope of this paper, however, it is reasonable to assume
that it will change the incentives of miners. Indeed, in this
computationally light paradigm, miners might be willing to
expend their computational resources to mine blocks that
contain larger transactions to maximize their rewards. This will
gradually increase the block’s gas limit which, as a result, will
favor the scale of our Hash tree-based PKI even more.
We now illustrate a few important points regarding hash
functions and precompiled contracts. Ethereum supports three
hash functions: 1) RIPEMD160, whose computation costs
600 gas, plus 120 gas per input word, 2) SHA-256, whose
computation costs 60 gas, plus 12 gas per input word, 3)
KECCAK-256, whose computation costs 30 gas, plus 6 gas per
input word. Functions (1) and (2) comply with the NIST stan-
dard and are implemented as precompiled contracts, however,
function (3), does not comply with the standard and is imple-
mented as an EVM opcode. These distinctions have interesting
implications. Because functions (1) and (2) are precompiled
contracts, they incur the extra gas cost of a message call (700
gas), while function (3) does not. Consequently, Ethereum’s
cost model encourages the use of a non-standard-compliant
hash function. Thus, application developers are forced to either
code the client side (at least in part) in JavaScript, for the
sole purpose of having access to Ethereum’s non-standard
implementation of (3), or, pay the extra gas cost. As one
of the main incentives of developers in these platforms is to
minimize gas costs, the aforementioned distinctions essentially
encourage client implementations that are unnecessarily com-
plicated and limit the use of standard, mature and efficient
libraries, such as libgcrypt ([44]). Recently, a proposal has
been submitted ([45]) to address this issue. If accepted, this
change will further diminish the gas cost of the Hash tree-
based PKI, thus, increasing its deployment scale.
Recommendation #3: Reduce message call costs from
precompiled contracts and equalize the costs of all sup-
ported hash functions.
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Fig. 1: Gas cost versus the number of accumulated values of 100,000 of the following hash tree accumulator verifications: (a)
(Non) Membership witnesses and, (b) Accumulator updates. Note the different y-axis scales.
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Fig. 2: Gas cost versus the number of registered
(identity,public-key) pairs of the registration and revocation
operations of 100,000 pairs in the Hash-based PKI.
Lastly, as illustrated previously, Ethereum is inconsistent in
the way it handles and exposes more complicated instructions.
Given that: 1) the size of EVM assembly opcodes is one byte,
2) most values are already in use ([46]) and, 3) the purpose of
assembly language is to provide access to low-level instruc-
tions, we believe that more sophisticated functionality (e.g.,
hash functions) should be offloaded to a standard library of
precompiled contracts. Furthermore, Ethereum should design
and incorporate a more developer-friendly way of addressing
these contracts. Currently, developers need to memorize (or
look up) the address in which each contract resides, e.g., SHA-
256 resides in address 0x02, which is cumbersome. Convenient
helper functions in EVM assembly that are translated to the
appropriate message calls would be helpful.
Recommendation #4: Sophisticated functionality should
Operation
Gas Cost
Min Max Mean Std
Register 89,469 89,661 89,643.91 33.74
Revoke 904,197 949,505 931,150.28 6,410.29
TABLE II: Min, max, mean and standard deviation (columns
2-5) of the gas cost of registering and revoking 10,000
randomly generated (identity,public-key) pairs in the Linear
State PKI contract.
be moved to a standard library of precompiled contracts
that can be addressed in a developer-friendly manner.
C. Linear State PKI Evaluation
In this section, we present experiments that evaluate a
simple smart contract PKI which stores all (identity,public-
key) pairs in the contract’s state. This is the same approach
that prior proposals employ (e.g., [11], [12], [13]), including
the Ethereum Name Service, and allows us to illustrate the
shortcomings of Ethereum’s pricing of storage. In this simple
scheme, registration and revocation are straightforward pro-
cesses. During registration, the contract checks if there is an
entry for the input identity in its state. Assuming there isn’t
one, it adds it. During revocation, the contract first validates the
input signature, as in the prior two constructions, and checks if
there is an entry in its state for that identity. If so, the contract
simply removes it from its state. Table II illustrates the gas cost
of registering and revoking 10,000 (identity,public-key) pairs
in this setting. During revocation, part of the contract’s storage
is freed, and the transaction is refunded gas. As a result, the
overall cost of revocation is less than the verification of a
Secp256r1 signature.
Discussion: Clearly, this is, currently, the least costly ap-
proach to deploy on Ethereum and the reasons are straight-
forward. First, it is light in terms of computation. Indeed,
excluding signature verification, which is the dominant cost
of revocation, the contract spans a total of 10 lines of Solidity
code, consisting solely of a few if statements. Second, as stated
by Buterin ([47]), storage is extremely underpriced and, as of
yet, there is no incentive for freeing it. However, the issue
of storage and its effect on the size of Ethereum’s state is
complex. Miners decide whether they include a transaction
in a block according to their “private cost”, i.e., their own
private resource expenditure. Regardless, their decision affects
the entire network, as all participating nodes have to download
and validate newly mined blocks, without having a choice in
the matter. For instance, if we take the Linear State PKI as
a reference point, it might be favorable for some miner(s) to
store a few bytes on disk, e.g., due to having abundant and
inexpensive disk space. However, that may not be the case
for other nodes participating in the protocol. This suggests
a “social cost” of transactions which may not be completely
aligned to an individual miner’s private costs. If this social cost
of transactions is not completely accounted for, the increasing
size of Ethereum’s state may deincentivise new full nodes from
entering the system. Furthermore, the size of Ethereum’s state
can also be an obstacle to nodes merely syncing with the
system. This issue affects a variety of topics ranging from,
light clients (e.g., smartphones) being able to interface with
smart contracts, to blockchain security.
One of the proposed countermeasures is imposing small,
static rent fees on contracts ([48]) so as to avoid being “deac-
tivated”, i.e., no one being able to interact with them. However,
it is Ethereum’s static cost model that has caused this problem
in the first place. We believe storage is a special commodity
and that its price should be dynamically adjusted. Base storage
price should depend on the global size of Ethereum’s state,
i.e., the bigger the size of its state, the higher the base storage
price. In addition, the cost of transactions that increase the size
of a contract’s state should scale accordingly, thus, providing
a counterincentive to over-utilizing contract storage.
Recommendation #5: Storage costs should take into
account the current blockchain’s size as well as the size of
the invoked contract’s state.
Clearly, the issue of storage costs is complex and remains
an open problem requiring future research to be addressed
properly. Nonetheless, the constant state PKI constructions
discussed in this work are well aligned with space optimal
use of smart contract platforms.
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APPENDIX
Smart Contract State: N1, N2, k ∈ Z, c1 ∈ ZN1 , g1 ∈
QRN1 , c2 ∈ ZN2 , g2 ∈ QRN2 , A ∈ GF (2)
k×3k
1) Constructor(g1, N1, g2, N2, k, A) :
Store input values g1, N1, g2, N2, k, A to the correspond-
ing state variables
c1 = InitAcc(g1, N1)
c2 = InitAcc(g2, N2)
2) Register(id, pk, i,W1,W2) :
xp2 ← Map(k, A, (id, i, a))
if VerifyNonMem(pk2, xp2 ,W1, c2) = 0
return fail
endif
if i ≥ 2
x′p2 ← Map(k,A, (id, i− 1, d))
if VerifyMem(pk2, x
′
p2
,W2, c2) = 0
return fail
endif
endif
xp1 ← Map(k, A, (id, pk, i, a))
(c1,W1)← Add(pk1, xp1 , c1)
(c2,W2)← Add(pk2, xp2 , c2)
return (c1,W1, c2,W2)
3) Revoke(id, pk, i,W1,W2, σsk(pk)) :
xp1 ← Map(k, A, (id, pk, i, d))
x′p1 ← Map(k, A, (id, pk, i, a))
if VerifyNonMem(pk1, xp1 ,W2, c1) = 0 ∨ VerifyMem
(pk1, x
′
p1
,W1, c1) = 0 ∨ VerifySig(σsk(pk), pk) = 0
return fail
endif
xp2 ← Map(k, A, (id, i, d))
(c1,W1)← Add(pk1, xp1 , c1)
(c2,W2)← Add(pk2, xp2 , c2)
return (c1,W1, c2,W2)
4) RetrieveState() :
return (c1, c2, k, A)
Fig. 3: Pseudocode of the smart contract of the RSA-based
construction. The Constructor function is executed once, dur-
ing contract deployment and initializes the contract’s state. The
remaining functions constitute the main interface of the smart
contract, i.e., registering (Register) and revoking (Revoke) an
(id, pk) pair and retrieving its current state (RetrieveState).
In this section, we present figures that illustrate the pseu-
docode of the smart contract pertaining to each construction
of Section V. In both cases, the interface of the smart contract
is comprised of four functions. The Constructor is invoked
only when the contract is deployed and serves as a means to
initialize its state. The Register and Revoke functions consti-
tute the main operations of the smart contract for registering
and revoking, respectively, (identity,public-key) pairs. Lastly,
RetrieveState is a helper function that clients invoke to obtain
Smart Contract State: c1, c2, λ1, λ2 ∈ Z
1) Constructor(λ1, λ2) :
Store input values λ1, λ2 to the corresponding state vari-
ables
c1 ← InitAcc(λ1)
c2 ← InitAcc(λ2)
2) Register(id, pk,W2, cadd1 ,Wadd1 , cadd2 ,Wadd2) :
if sizeof(id) 6= λ2 ∨ CheckUpdate(c2, cadd2 ,Wadd2 , id)
= 0 ∨ sizeof(id, pk) 6= λ1 ∨ CheckUpdate(c1, cadd1 ,
Wadd1 , (id, pk)) = 0 ∨ VerifyNonMem(c2,W2, id) = 0
return fail
endif
c1 ← cadd1
c2 ← cadd2
3) Revoke(id, pk,W1, σsk(pk), cdel1 ,Wdel1 , cdel2 ,Wdel2) :
if sizeof(id) 6= λ2∨sizeof(id, pk) 6= λ1∨VerifyMem(c1,
W1, (id, pk)) = 0 ∨ VerifySig(σsk(pk), pk) =
0 ∨ CheckUpdate(c1, cdel1 ,Wdel1 , (id, pk)) = 0 ∨
CheckUpdate(c2, cdel2 ,Wdel2 , id) = 0
return fail
endif
c1 ← cdel1
c2 ← cdel2
4) RetrieveState() :
return (c1, c2, λ1, λ2)
Fig. 4: Pseudocode of the smart contract in the Hash-based
construction. The Constructor function is executed once, dur-
ing contract deployment and initializes the contract’s state. The
remaining functions constitute the main interface of the smart
contract, i.e., registering (Register) and revoking (Revoke) an
(id, pk) pair and retrieving its current state (RetrieveState).
The sizeof operator outputs the number of bits of its input.
the current state of the smart contract, e.g., via Ethereum’s
web3.js API ([49]). The Solidity code of the smart contracts,
as well as, that of all the building blocks that we employ in
our implementations, can be made available upon request.
Figure 3 illustrates the pseudocode of the RSA-based PKI
of Section V-A. Its state is comprised of the following: 1)
two RSA accumulator values, c1 and c2, 2) the accumulators’
respective RSA moduli, N1 and N2, 3) the accumulators’
exponentiation bases, g1 and g2, which are quadratic residues
modulo N1 and N2, respectively and, 4) the parameters of
the Map procedure where, k, is its security parameter that,
among others, determines the bit length of the primes that
Map outputs (3k bits long) and, A, is a randomly generated
k × 3k bit matrix.
Figure 4 illustrates the pseudocode of the Hash-based PKI
of Section V-B. Its state is comprised of the following: 1) two
Hash accumulator values, c1 and c2 and, 2) the accumulators’
respective security parameters, λ1 and λ2, which, essentially,
determine the number of bits of the accumulators’ inputs. To
this end, and as illustrated in the smart contract’s pseudocode,
we employ a sizeof operator which, on input an arbitrary string
s, outputs its bit length.
